Costs associated with trafc externalities such as congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera are becoming “unbearable‿. The Braess paradox shows that combating congestion by adding infrastructure may not improve trafc conditions, and geographical and/or nancial constraints may not allow infrastructure expansion. Road pricing presents an alternative to combat the mentioned externalities. The traditional way of road pricing, namely; congestion charging, may create negative benets for the society and stakeholders, thus, defeating its main purpose (increasing transportation efciency and social welfare). We study a road pricing that encompasses all the mentioned externalities. A meanwhile standard approach to deal with conﬂicting objectives (externalities) are models from Multi-objective Optimization. This approach assumes that there is one leader stakeholder/decision-maker. But then, if more than one stakeholder participates in the road pricing, the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) from economics may constitute an alternative model. Using game theoretic approach, we study and extend the single authority road pricing scheme (Stackelberg game) to a pricing scheme with multiple authorities/regions (with likely contradicting objectives). Our model includes users interests in the upper level - giving a promising model that deals with user acceptability of road pricing. We investigate the existence of NE among actors and prove that no pure NE exists in general. Then again, NE may exist under special conditions. Since NE may not exist, and since competition may deteriorate the social welfare, we further design a mechanism that simultaneously induces a pure NE and cooperative behaviour among actors, thus, yielding optimal tolls for the system.
|Title of host publication||Compendium of Papers of the Transportation Research Board (TRB), 91st Annual Meeting, Washington DC, January 22-26, 2012.|
|Place of Publication||Washington|
|Publisher||Transportation Research Board (TRB)|
|Number of pages||21|
|ISBN (Print)||not assigned|
|Publication status||Published - Jan 2012|
|Event||91st Transportation Research Board (TRB) Annual Meeting 2012 - Washington, United States|
Duration: 22 Jan 2012 → 26 Jan 2012
Conference number: 91
|Publisher||Transportation Research Board|
|Conference||91st Transportation Research Board (TRB) Annual Meeting 2012|
|Period||22/01/12 → 26/01/12|
Ohazulike, A., Bliemer, M. C. J., Still, G. J., & van Berkum, E. C. (2012). Multi-objective road pricing: Game Theoretic and Multistakeholder Approach. In Compendium of Papers of the Transportation Research Board (TRB), 91st Annual Meeting, Washington DC, January 22-26, 2012. (pp. 1-21). Washington: Transportation Research Board (TRB).