TY - CHAP
T1 - Multiple Stakeholders in Road Pricing
T2 - A Game Theoretic Approach
AU - Ohazulike, Anthony E.
AU - Still, Georg
AU - Kern, Walter
AU - van Berkum, Eric C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - We investigate a game theoretic approach as an alternative to the standard multi-objective optimization models for road pricing. Assuming that various, partly conflicting traffic externalities (congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera) are represented by corresponding players acting on a common network, we obtain a non-cooperative game where each player pursues a different road pricing strategy to control a specific externality. The game is actually a Stackelberg game, but now with multiple leaders/actors in the upper level determining link tolls, and road users as followers in the lower level, adapting their route choice to the tolls imposed. This chapter reviews our earlier results on the game theoretic models, and the existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to cope with the fact that NE may not exist in the game, we propose a “first-best taxation” scheme, allowing the government to enforce pre-described NE (analogous first-best pricing schemes). We further discuss the stability of this taxing mechanism.
AB - We investigate a game theoretic approach as an alternative to the standard multi-objective optimization models for road pricing. Assuming that various, partly conflicting traffic externalities (congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera) are represented by corresponding players acting on a common network, we obtain a non-cooperative game where each player pursues a different road pricing strategy to control a specific externality. The game is actually a Stackelberg game, but now with multiple leaders/actors in the upper level determining link tolls, and road users as followers in the lower level, adapting their route choice to the tolls imposed. This chapter reviews our earlier results on the game theoretic models, and the existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In order to cope with the fact that NE may not exist in the game, we propose a “first-best taxation” scheme, allowing the government to enforce pre-described NE (analogous first-best pricing schemes). We further discuss the stability of this taxing mechanism.
KW - Equilibrium problem with equilibrium conditions
KW - Mechanism design
KW - Multi-level optimization
KW - Multi-objective optimization
KW - Nash equilibrium
KW - Road pricing game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85139122780&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-11674-7_7
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-11674-7_7
M3 - Chapter
SN - 978-3-319-11673-0
T3 - Springer Series in Reliability Engineering
SP - 159
EP - 189
BT - Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security
A2 - Hausken, Kjell
A2 - Zhuang, Jun
PB - Springer
CY - London
ER -