Network congestion games are robust to variable demand

José Correa; Ruben Hoeksma; Marc Schröder

doi:10.1016/j.trb.2018.11.010

Network congestion games are robust to variable demand

José Correa, Ruben Hoeksma, Marc Schröder^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

We consider a non-atomic network congestion game with incomplete information in which nature decides which commodities travel. The users of a commodity do not know which other commodities travel and only have distributional information about their presence. Our main result is that the price of anarchy bounds known for the deterministic demand game also apply to the Bayesian game with random demand, even if the travel probabilities of different commodities are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, the extension result of price of anarchy bounds for complete information games to incomplete information games in which the set of players is randomly determined can be generalized to the class of smooth games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	69-78
Number of pages	10
Journal	Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
Volume	119
Early online date	19 Nov 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2018.11.010
Publication status	Published - Jan 2019
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/j.trb.2018.11.010

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title = "Network congestion games are robust to variable demand",

abstract = "We consider a non-atomic network congestion game with incomplete information in which nature decides which commodities travel. The users of a commodity do not know which other commodities travel and only have distributional information about their presence. Our main result is that the price of anarchy bounds known for the deterministic demand game also apply to the Bayesian game with random demand, even if the travel probabilities of different commodities are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, the extension result of price of anarchy bounds for complete information games to incomplete information games in which the set of players is randomly determined can be generalized to the class of smooth games.",

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AU - Correa, José

AU - Hoeksma, Ruben

AU - Schröder, Marc

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N2 - We consider a non-atomic network congestion game with incomplete information in which nature decides which commodities travel. The users of a commodity do not know which other commodities travel and only have distributional information about their presence. Our main result is that the price of anarchy bounds known for the deterministic demand game also apply to the Bayesian game with random demand, even if the travel probabilities of different commodities are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, the extension result of price of anarchy bounds for complete information games to incomplete information games in which the set of players is randomly determined can be generalized to the class of smooth games.

AB - We consider a non-atomic network congestion game with incomplete information in which nature decides which commodities travel. The users of a commodity do not know which other commodities travel and only have distributional information about their presence. Our main result is that the price of anarchy bounds known for the deterministic demand game also apply to the Bayesian game with random demand, even if the travel probabilities of different commodities are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, the extension result of price of anarchy bounds for complete information games to incomplete information games in which the set of players is randomly determined can be generalized to the class of smooth games.

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DO - 10.1016/j.trb.2018.11.010

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VL - 119

SP - 69

EP - 78

JO - Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

JF - Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

ER -

Network congestion games are robust to variable demand

Abstract

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