Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers

Daniel Schmand; Marc Schröder; Alexander Skopalik

doi:10.48550/arXiv.1904.10417

Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers

Daniel Schmand
, Marc Schröder
, Alexander Skopalik

Mathematics of Operations Research

Research output: Working paper › Preprint › Academic

88 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

Original language	English
Publisher	ArXiv.org
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1904.10417
Publication status	Published - 23 Apr 2019

Keywords

cs.GT
cs.MA

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10.48550/arXiv.1904.10417Licence: Other

PreprintFinal published version, 307 KBLicence: Other

Network investment games with wardrop followers
Schmand, D., Schröder, M. & Skopalik, A., 1 Jul 2019, 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP 2019. Baier, C., Chatzigiannakis, I., Flocchini, P. & Leonardi, S. (eds.). Dagstuhl, 151. (Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs; vol. 132).
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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abstract = " We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. ",

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N2 - We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

AB - We study a two-sided network investment game consisting of two sets of players, called providers and users. The game is set in two stages. In the first stage, providers aim to maximize their profit by investing in bandwidth of cloud computing services. The investments of the providers yield a set of usable services for the users. In the second stage, each user wants to process a task and therefore selects a bundle of services so as to minimize the total processing time. We assume the total processing time to be separable over the chosen services and the processing time of each service to depend on the utilization of the service and the installed bandwidth. We provide insights on how competition between providers affects the total costs of the users and show that every game on a series-parallel graph can be reduced to an equivalent single edge game when analyzing the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

KW - cs.GT

KW - cs.MA

U2 - 10.48550/arXiv.1904.10417

DO - 10.48550/arXiv.1904.10417

M3 - Preprint

BT - Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers

PB - ArXiv.org

ER -

Network Investment Game with Wardrop Followers

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Network investment games with wardrop followers

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