Non-cooperative queueing games on a network of single server queues

Corine M. Laan, Judith Timmer*, Richard Boucherie

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

This paper introduces non-cooperative games on a network of single server queues with fixed routes. A player has a set of routes available and has to decide which route(s) to use for its customers. Each player’s goal is to minimize the expected sojourn time of its customers. We consider two cases: a continuous strategy space, where each player is allowed to divide its customers over multiple routes, and a discrete strategy space, where each player selects a single route for all its customers. For the continuous strategy space, we show that a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists that can be found using a best-response algorithm. For the discrete strategy space, we show that the game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, but need not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We show the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for four subclasses: (i) N-player games with equal arrival rates for the players, (ii) 2-player games with identical service rates for all nodes, (iii) 2-player games on a 2 × 2-grid, and (iv) 2-player games on an A × B-grid with small differences in the service rates.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages23
JournalQueueing systems
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print/First online - 25 Jan 2021

Keywords

  • Routing
  • Network of single-server queues
  • Non-cooperative games
  • Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

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