On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games

Theo Driessen, Vito Fragnelli, Ilya V. Katsev, Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya

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The insurance situation in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we present certain conditions on the parameters of the model that guarantee the 1-convexity property of co-insurance games which in turn ensures the nonemptiness of the core and the linearity of the nucleolus as a function of the variable premium. Further we reveal conditions when a co-insurance game is representable in the form of a veto-removed game and present an efficient final algorithm for computing the nucleolus of a veto-removed game.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)217-225
Number of pages19
JournalInsurance: mathematics & economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2011


  • MSC-91A12
  • MSC-91A40
  • MSC-91B30
  • EWI-19501
  • IR-75869
  • Cooperative game
  • Core
  • Nucleolus
  • METIS-277518
  • Insurance situation

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