On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games

Theo Driessen, Vito Fragnelli, Ilya V. Katsev, Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya

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Abstract

The situation, in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies, is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called co-insurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004). In this paper we show that a co-insurance game possesses several interesting properties that allow to study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and to construct an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
Number of pages19
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2010

Publication series

NameMemorandum / Department of Applied Mathematics
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
No.1913
ISSN (Print)1874-4850
ISSN (Electronic)1874-4850

Keywords

  • MSC-91A12
  • EWI-17098
  • Insurance
  • METIS-270706
  • Nucleolus
  • IR-69239
  • Core
  • Cooperative game
  • MSC-91B30
  • MSC-91A40

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