On finding large sets of rewards in two-player ETP-ESP games

Reinoud Joosten*, Llea Samuel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Games with endogenous transition probabilities and endogenous stage payoffs (or ETP-ESP games for short) are stochastic games in which both the transition probabilities and the payoffs at any stage are continuous functions of the relative frequencies of all past action combinations chosen. We present methods to compute large sets of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards in two-player ETP-ESP games with communicating states under the limiting average reward criterion. Such sets are useful in determining feasible rewards in a game, and instrumental in obtaining the set of (Nash) equilibrium rewards.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2040002
JournalInternational game theory review
Volume22
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 May 2020

Keywords

  • (non)homogeneous Markov chains
  • average rewards
  • endogenous transition probabilities and stage payoffs
  • Stochastic games

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