On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

Elena Yanovskaya; Theo Driessen

doi:10.1007/s001820200093

On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

Elena Yanovskaya, Theo Driessen

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment generalizes Sobolev's axiomatization of the Shapley value.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	601-609
Journal	International journal of game theory
Volume	30
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200093
Publication status	Published - 2002

Keywords

IR-92528
METIS-306395

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10.1007/s001820200093

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AB - In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment generalizes Sobolev's axiomatization of the Shapley value.

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DO - 10.1007/s001820200093

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EP - 609

JO - International journal of game theory

JF - International journal of game theory

IS - 4

ER -

On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

Abstract

Keywords

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