## Abstract

Games with endogenous transition probabilities and endogenous stage payoffs (or ETP-ESP-games) are stochastic games in which both the transition probabilities and the payo¤s at any stage are continuous functions of the relative frequencies of all action combinations chosen in the past.

We present methods to compute large sets of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards in ETP-ESP-games with communicating states. Such sets are useful in determining feasible rewards in a game. They are also instrumental in obtaining the set of (Nash) equilibrium rewards.

We present methods to compute large sets of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards in ETP-ESP-games with communicating states. Such sets are useful in determining feasible rewards in a game. They are also instrumental in obtaining the set of (Nash) equilibrium rewards.

Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Enschede |

Publisher | University of Twente |

Number of pages | 28 |

Publication status | Published - 20 Jun 2017 |