On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs

Judith B. Timmer, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)595-613
Number of pages19
JournalInternational journal of game theory
Volume32
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2004

Keywords

  • Cooperative games - Random variables - Shapley value
  • Shapley value
  • random variables
  • EWI-17803
  • MSC-91A12
  • METIS-220442
  • IR-58681
  • Cooperative games

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