TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal deployment for anti-submarine operations with time-dependent strategies

AU - Laan, Corine M.

AU - Barros, Ana Isabel

AU - Boucherie, Richard J.

AU - Monsuur, Herman

AU - Noordkamp, Wouter

PY - 2019/6/24

Y1 - 2019/6/24

N2 - In this paper, we consider the optimal deployment of multiple assets in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations with time-dependent strategies. We model this as a zero-sum game that takes place over a finite time horizon. An agent, representing multiple assets, in an ASW operation, decides on the allocation of these assets (e.g., one or more frigates and helicopters) to prevent an intruder, an enemy submarine, from attacking a moving high-value unit (HVU), e.g., a tanker ship. Hereby, the agent aims to prevent an intruder, an enemy submarine, from attacking a moving HVU, e.g., a tanker ship. The intruder is deciding on a route that minimizes the detection probability given the agent’s strategy. We first consider a game model where a part of the agent’s strategy, namely the complete strategy of a frigate, is known to the intruder; and second, we consider a sequential game approach where the exact location of the frigate becomes known to the intruder at the start of each time interval. For both approaches, we construct (integer) linear programs, give complexity results, and use an algorithmic approach to determine optimal strategies. Finally, we explore the added value of this approach in comparison to a traditional ASW simulation model.

AB - In this paper, we consider the optimal deployment of multiple assets in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations with time-dependent strategies. We model this as a zero-sum game that takes place over a finite time horizon. An agent, representing multiple assets, in an ASW operation, decides on the allocation of these assets (e.g., one or more frigates and helicopters) to prevent an intruder, an enemy submarine, from attacking a moving high-value unit (HVU), e.g., a tanker ship. Hereby, the agent aims to prevent an intruder, an enemy submarine, from attacking a moving HVU, e.g., a tanker ship. The intruder is deciding on a route that minimizes the detection probability given the agent’s strategy. We first consider a game model where a part of the agent’s strategy, namely the complete strategy of a frigate, is known to the intruder; and second, we consider a sequential game approach where the exact location of the frigate becomes known to the intruder at the start of each time interval. For both approaches, we construct (integer) linear programs, give complexity results, and use an algorithmic approach to determine optimal strategies. Finally, we explore the added value of this approach in comparison to a traditional ASW simulation model.

KW - Anti-submarine warfare

KW - game theory

KW - integer programming

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068167837&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1177/1548512919855435

DO - 10.1177/1548512919855435

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85068167837

JO - Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation

JF - Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation

SN - 1548-5129

ER -