Optimization Implementation and Characterization of the Equal Allocation of Nonseparable Costs Value

Panfei Sun, Dongshuang Hou (Corresponding Author), Hao Sun, Theo Driessen

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3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper devotes to the study of the equal allocation of nonseparable
costs value for cooperative games. On the one hand, we show that the equal allocation
of nonseparable costs value is the unique optimal solution that minimizes the total
complaints for individual players over the pre-imputation set. On the other hand,
analogously to the way of determining the Nucleolus, we obtain the equal allocation
of nonseparable costs value by applying the lexicographic order over the individual
complaints. Moreover, we offer alternative characterizations of the equal allocation of
nonseparable costs value by proposing several new properties such as dual nullifying
player property, dual dummifying player property and grand marginal contribution
monotonicity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)336-352
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of optimization theory and applications
Volume173
Issue number1
Early online date9 Mar 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2017

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • The equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
  • Optimization
  • Complaint
  • Characterization

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