Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, Elena B. Yanovskaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-261
Number of pages7
JournalMathematical methods of operations research
Volume66
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Keywords

  • MSC-91A12
  • Owen value
  • Cooperative TU game
  • Coalitional structure
  • Axiomatic characterization
  • Marginality

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