Policymaking, comitology, and the balance of power in the European Union

Bernard Steunenberg, Christian Koboldt, Dieter Schmidtchen

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articleAcademic

40 Citations (Scopus)
21 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)329-344
JournalInternational review of law and economics
Volume16
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 1996
EventConference on Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union 1995 - Saarbrücken, Germany
Duration: 3 Sep 19955 Sep 1995

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