Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision.
|Journal||International review of law and economics|
|Publication status||Published - Sep 1996|
|Event||Conference on Constitutional Law and Economics of the European Union 1995 - Saarbrücken, Germany|
Duration: 3 Sep 1995 → 5 Sep 1995
Steunenberg, B., Koboldt, C., & Schmidtchen, D. (1996). Policymaking, comitology, and the balance of power in the European Union. International review of law and economics, 16(3), 329-344. https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(96)00026-9