Preventing the Decodability Attack Based Cross-Matching in a Fuzzy Commitment Scheme

E.J.C. Kelkboom, Jeroen Breebaart, Tom A.M. Kevenaar, I.R. Buhan, Raymond N.J. Veldhuis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Template protection techniques are used within biometric systems in order to safeguard the privacy of the system's subjects. This protection also includes unlinkability, i.e., preventing cross-matching between two or more reference templates from the same subject across different applications. In the literature, the template protection techniques based on fuzzy commitment, also known as the code-offset construction, have recently been investigated. Recent work presented the decodability attack vulnerability facilitating cross-matching based on the protected templates and its theoretical analysis. First, we extend the theoretical analysis and include the comparison between the system and cross-matching performance. We validate the presented analysis using real biometric data from the MCYT fingerprint database. Second, we show that applying a random bit-permutation process secures the fuzzy commitment scheme from cross-matching based on the decodability attack.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)107-121
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE transactions on information forensics and security
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011

Keywords

  • SCS-Safety
  • Data Security
  • IR-76453
  • METIS-279145
  • Biometrics
  • secure biometric data
  • data privacy
  • Template Protection
  • EWI-19843

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