Abstract
Template protection techniques are used within biometric systems in order to safeguard the privacy of the system's subjects. This protection also includes unlinkability, i.e., preventing cross-matching between two or more reference templates from the same subject across different applications. In the literature, the template protection techniques based on fuzzy commitment, also known as the code-offset construction, have recently been investigated. Recent work presented the decodability attack vulnerability facilitating cross-matching based on the protected templates and its theoretical analysis. First, we extend the theoretical analysis and include the comparison between the system and cross-matching performance. We validate the presented analysis using real biometric data from the MCYT fingerprint database. Second, we show that applying a random bit-permutation process secures the fuzzy commitment scheme from cross-matching based on the decodability attack.
| Original language | Undefined |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 107-121 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | IEEE transactions on information forensics and security |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2011 |
Keywords
- SCS-Safety
- Data Security
- IR-76453
- METIS-279145
- Biometrics
- secure biometric data
- data privacy
- Template Protection
- EWI-19843
Cite this
Kelkboom, E. J. C., Breebaart, J., Kevenaar, T. A. M., Buhan, I. R., & Veldhuis, R. N. J. (2011). Preventing the Decodability Attack Based Cross-Matching in a Fuzzy Commitment Scheme. IEEE transactions on information forensics and security, 6(1), 107-121. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2010.2091637