Abstract
Template protection techniques are used within biometric systems in order to safeguard the privacy of the system's subjects. This protection also includes unlinkability, i.e., preventing cross-matching between two or more reference templates from the same subject across different applications. In the literature, the template protection techniques based on fuzzy commitment, also known as the code-offset construction, have recently been investigated. Recent work presented the decodability attack vulnerability facilitating cross-matching based on the protected templates and its theoretical analysis. First, we extend the theoretical analysis and include the comparison between the system and cross-matching performance. We validate the presented analysis using real biometric data from the MCYT fingerprint database. Second, we show that applying a random bit-permutation process secures the fuzzy commitment scheme from cross-matching based on the decodability attack.
Original language | Undefined |
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Pages (from-to) | 107-121 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | IEEE transactions on information forensics and security |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2011 |
Keywords
- SCS-Safety
- Data Security
- IR-76453
- METIS-279145
- Biometrics
- secure biometric data
- data privacy
- Template Protection
- EWI-19843