Abstract
Formal methods have provided us with tools to check both
anonymity of protocols and - more specifically - receipt-freeness of voting
protocols. One of the frameworks used for proving anonymity is epistemic
logic. However, to the best of our knowledge, epistemic logic has never
been used to prove receipt-freeness of voting protocols. Still, the concept
of indistinguishability used in formalizing anonymity seems to apply to
receipt-freeness as well: a vote for one party should be indistinguishable
from a vote for another party, even if the voter supplies additional in-
formation outside the scope of the protocol. In this paper, we formalize
this aspect of anonymity relations, in order to provide an alternative
formalization of receipt-freeness in voting protocols, based on epistemic
logic.
Original language | Undefined |
---|---|
Number of pages | 8 |
Publication status | Published - 2006 |
Event | IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2006) - Cambridge, UK Duration: 29 Jun 2006 → 30 Jun 2006 |
Workshop
Workshop | IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2006) |
---|---|
Period | 29/06/06 → 30/06/06 |
Other | 29-30 Jun 2006 |
Keywords
- IR-65116
- EWI-14126
- SCS-Cybersecurity