The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.
|Title of host publication||Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research|
|Editors||T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, A. Sen|
|Place of Publication||Kluwer, Dordrecht|
|Number of pages||19|
|Publication status||Published - 15 Jan 1997|
Driessen, T. S. H., & Funaki, Y. (1997). Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games. In T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J. A. M. Potters, T. E. S. Raghavan, D. Ray, & A. Sen (Eds.), Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research (pp. 85-103). Kluwer, Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_8