Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games

T. S. H. Driessen, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review


    The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationGame Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research
    EditorsT. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, A. Sen
    Place of PublicationKluwer, Dordrecht
    Number of pages19
    ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4757-2640-4
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4419-4780-2
    Publication statusPublished - 15 Jan 1997


    • METIS-141664


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