Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games

T. S. H. Driessen; Yukihiko Funaki

doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_8

Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games

T. S. H. Driessen
, Yukihiko Funaki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research
Editors	T. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, A. Sen
Place of Publication	Kluwer, Dordrecht
Publisher	Springer
Pages	85-103
Number of pages	19
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-4757-2640-4
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4419-4780-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_8
Publication status	Published - 15 Jan 1997

Keywords

METIS-141664

Access to Document

10.1007/978-1-4757-2640-4_8

Cite this

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title = "Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games",

abstract = "The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.",

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Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games. / Driessen, T. S. H.; Funaki, Yukihiko.
Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research. ed. / T. Parthasarathy; B. Dutta; J.A.M. Potters; T.E.S. Raghavan; D. Ray; A. Sen. Kluwer, Dordrecht: Springer, 1997. p. 85-103.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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N2 - The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.

AB - The egalitarian non-individual contribution (ENIC-)value represents the equal division of the surplus of the total profits, given that each player is already allocated some kind of a yet unspecified individual contribution. Four particular versions, the CIS-, ENSC-, ENPAC-, ENBC-values, are also considered by choosing the individual worth, the separable contribution, the pairwise-averaged contribution and the Banzhaf contribution as the notion of individual contribution. Axiomatic characterizations of the ENIC-value in general and the four particular ENIC values are provided on the class of cooperative games with a fixed player set as well as a variable player set. The latter axiomatization involves a consistency axiom in terms of reduced games.

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PB - Springer

CY - Kluwer, Dordrecht

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Reduced Game Properties of Egalitarian Division Rules for TU-Games

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Keywords

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