A transferable utility game deals with problems of how to allocate the total benefit among players by considering contributions of various coalitions of players to the total benefit. A value for games is an allocation of the total benefit among them. Many values such as the Shapley value and the prenucleolus are introduced by their own equity consideration. Thus a consistency in terms of a reduced game is a useful tool to compare various solutions in a unified way, because it expresses the differences in solutions as those in associated reduced games. This paper axiomatizes linear values with Equal Treatment Property by the consistency in terms of a reduced game.
|Title of host publication||Operations Research and Management Science at Work|
|Editors||E. Kozan, A. Ohuchi|
|Place of Publication||Dordrecht|
|Publisher||Kluwer Academic Publishers|
|Publication status||Published - 2002|
|Name||International Series in Operations Research & Management Science|
Driessen, T., & Namekata, T. (2002). Reduced game property of linear values with equal treatment property. In E. Kozan, & A. Ohuchi (Eds.), Operations Research and Management Science at Work (pp. 317-332). (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science; Vol. 43). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0819-9_20