Reduced game property of linear values with equal treatment property

Theo Driessen, T. Namekata

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

A transferable utility game deals with problems of how to allocate the total benefit among players by considering contributions of various coalitions of players to the total benefit. A value for games is an allocation of the total benefit among them. Many values such as the Shapley value and the prenucleolus are introduced by their own equity consideration. Thus a consistency in terms of a reduced game is a useful tool to compare various solutions in a unified way, because it expresses the differences in solutions as those in associated reduced games. This paper axiomatizes linear values with Equal Treatment Property by the consistency in terms of a reduced game.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOperations Research and Management Science at Work
EditorsE. Kozan, A. Ohuchi
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherKluwer Academic Publishers
Pages317-332
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4615-0819-9
ISBN (Print)0-7923-7588-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Publication series

NameInternational Series in Operations Research & Management Science
Volume43

Keywords

  • METIS-208505

Cite this

Driessen, T., & Namekata, T. (2002). Reduced game property of linear values with equal treatment property. In E. Kozan, & A. Ohuchi (Eds.), Operations Research and Management Science at Work (pp. 317-332). (International Series in Operations Research & Management Science; Vol. 43). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0819-9_20