Reproducibility Study and Assessment of the Evolution of Serial BGP Hijacking Events

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the Internet’s most crucial protocol for efficient global connectivity and traffic routing. However, BGP is well known to be susceptible to route hijacks and leaks. Route hijacks are the intentional or unintentional illegitimate announcements of network resources that can compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of communication systems. In the past, the so-called “serial hijackers” have hijacked Internet resources multiple times, some lasting for several months or years. So far, only the paper “Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers” has explicitly focused on these repeat offenders, and it dates back to 2019. Back then, they had to process large amounts of BGP announcements to find a few potential serial hijackers. In this paper, we revisit the profiling of serial hijackers. We reproduced the 2019 study and showed that we can identify potential offenders with less data while achieving similar accuracy. Our study confirms that there has been no significant increase in the evolution of serial hijacking activities in the last five years. We then extend their research, further analyze the characteristics of the serial hijackers, and show that most of the alleged serial hijackers are still active on the Internet. We also find that 22.9% of the hijacks violated RPKI objects but were still widely propagated, and that even MANRS participants were among the propagating networks.