Abstract
In information security research, perceived security usually has a negative meaning, when it is used in contrast to actual security. From a phenomenological perspective, however, perceived security is all we have. This paper develops a phenomenological account of information security, in which a distinction is made between revealed and reveiled security instead. Linking these notions with the concepts of confidence and trust, the paper provides a phenomenological explanation of the electronic voting controversy in the Netherlands.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 176-188 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Keywords
- EWI-19030
- METIS-276727
- IR-75123
- Trust
- Information Security
- Phenomenology
- Risk
- SCS-Cybersecurity
- Electronic voting
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Cite this
Pieters, W. (2010). Reve{a,i}ling the Risks: A Phenomenology of Information Security. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 14(3), 176-188. https://doi.org/10.5840/techne201014321