Road pricing mechanisms - A game theoretic and multi-level approach

Anthony Ohazulike

Research output: ThesisPhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UTAcademic

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Abstract

Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.
Original languageEnglish
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Kern, Walter , Advisor
  • van Berkum, E., Supervisor
  • Uetz, Marc Jochen, Supervisor
  • Still, Georg Josef, Advisor
Award date24 Jan 2014
Place of PublicationEnschede
Publisher
Print ISBNs978-90-5584-170-7
Publication statusPublished - 24 Jan 2014

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Optimal systems
Accidents
Costs

Keywords

  • EWI-24556

Cite this

Ohazulike, A. (2014). Road pricing mechanisms - A game theoretic and multi-level approach. Enschede: Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT).
Ohazulike, Anthony. / Road pricing mechanisms - A game theoretic and multi-level approach. Enschede : Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT), 2014. 192 p.
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Road pricing mechanisms - A game theoretic and multi-level approach. / Ohazulike, Anthony.

Enschede : Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT), 2014. 192 p.

Research output: ThesisPhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UTAcademic

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Ohazulike A. Road pricing mechanisms - A game theoretic and multi-level approach. Enschede: Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT), 2014. 192 p.