Road pricing mechanisms: A game theoretic and multi-level approach

Anthony E. Ohazulike

Research output: ThesisPhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

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Abstract

Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • University of Twente
Supervisors/Advisors
  • van Berkum, Eric C., Supervisor
  • Uetz, Marc Jochen, Supervisor
  • Still, G.J., Co-Supervisor
  • Kern, W., Co-Supervisor
Award date24 Jan 2014
Place of PublicationEnschede
Publisher
Print ISBNs978-90-5584-170-7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 24 Jan 2014

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