Road pricing mechanisms: A game theoretic and multi-level approach

Anthony E. Ohazulike

doi:10.3990/1.9789055841707

Road pricing mechanisms: A game theoretic and multi-level approach

Anthony E. Ohazulike

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Thesis › PhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

801 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.

Original language	English
Qualification	Doctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution	University of Twente
Supervisors/Advisors	van Berkum, Eric C., Supervisor Uetz, Marc Jochen, Supervisor Still, G.J., Co-Supervisor Kern, W., Co-Supervisor
Award date	24 Jan 2014
Place of Publication	Enschede
Publisher	University of Twente
Print ISBNs	978-90-5584-170-7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3990/1.9789055841707
Publication status	Published - 24 Jan 2014

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.3990/1.9789055841707

Thesis A.E. OhazulikeFinal published version, 3.32 MB

Cite this

@phdthesis{a1b24cc0987c45c9b56922b99d710842,

title = "Road pricing mechanisms: A game theoretic and multi-level approach",

abstract = "Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.",

author = "Ohazulike, \{Anthony E.\}",

year = "2014",

month = jan,

day = "24",

doi = "10.3990/1.9789055841707",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-90-5584-170-7",

series = "CTIT Ph.D. thesis series",

publisher = "University of Twente",

number = "13-283",

address = "Netherlands",

type = "PhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT",

school = "University of Twente",

}

TY - THES

T1 - Road pricing mechanisms

T2 - A game theoretic and multi-level approach

AU - Ohazulike, Anthony E.

PY - 2014/1/24

Y1 - 2014/1/24

N2 - Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.

AB - Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.

U2 - 10.3990/1.9789055841707

DO - 10.3990/1.9789055841707

M3 - PhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

SN - 978-90-5584-170-7

T3 - CTIT Ph.D. thesis series

PB - University of Twente

CY - Enschede

ER -

Road pricing mechanisms: A game theoretic and multi-level approach

Abstract

UN SDGs

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this