Abstract
Road traffic externalities such as congestion, high noise levels, emission, accidents, are increasing due to the rise in vehicle ownership. Owing to financial, geographical and/or feasibility constraints, it could not be practically feasible to combat these externalities by expanding infrastructures. This thesis presents a novel and interesting road pricing approaches to deal with these conflicting objectives with multiple actors. Models show that we can induce optimal system performance among competing stakeholders.
| Original language | English |
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| Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
| Awarding Institution |
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| Supervisors/Advisors |
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| Award date | 24 Jan 2014 |
| Place of Publication | Enschede |
| Publisher | |
| Print ISBNs | 978-90-5584-170-7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 24 Jan 2014 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities
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