Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Corine Maartje Laan; Ana Isabel Barros; Richard Boucherie; Herman Monsuur

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Corine Maartje Laan, Ana Isabel Barros, Richard Boucherie, Herman Monsuur

Stochastic Operations Research

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Decision and Game Theory for Security
Subtitle of host publication	8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings
Editors	Stefan Rass, Bo An, Christopher Kiekintveld, Fei Fang, Stefan Schauer
Publisher	Springer
Pages	481-493
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-319-68711-7
ISBN (Print)	978-3-319-68710-0
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25
Publication status	Published - Oct 2017
Event	8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017 - Vienna, Austria Duration: 23 Oct 2017 → 25 Oct 2017 Conference number: 8

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	10575

Conference

Conference	8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017
Abbreviated title	GameSec 2017
Country/Territory	Austria
City	Vienna
Period	23/10/17 → 25/10/17

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10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Cite this

Laan, C. M., Barros, A. I., Boucherie, R., & Monsuur, H. (2017). Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. In S. Rass, B. An, C. Kiekintveld, F. Fang, & S. Schauer (Eds.), Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 481-493). ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10575). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Laan, Corine Maartje ; Barros, Ana Isabel ; Boucherie, Richard et al. / Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. editor / Stefan Rass ; Bo An ; Christopher Kiekintveld ; Fei Fang ; Stefan Schauer. Springer, 2017. pp. 481-493 ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent{\textquoteright}s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.",

author = "Laan, {Corine Maartje} and Barros, {Ana Isabel} and Richard Boucherie and Herman Monsuur",

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Laan, CM, Barros, AI, Boucherie, R & Monsuur, H 2017, Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. in S Rass, B An, C Kiekintveld, F Fang & S Schauer (eds), Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10575, Springer, pp. 481-493, 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, 23/10/17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. / Laan, Corine Maartje; Barros, Ana Isabel; Boucherie, Richard et al.
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. ed. / Stefan Rass; Bo An; Christopher Kiekintveld; Fei Fang; Stefan Schauer. Springer, 2017. p. 481-493 ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10575).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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T1 - Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

AU - Laan, Corine Maartje

AU - Barros, Ana Isabel

AU - Boucherie, Richard

AU - Monsuur, Herman

N1 - Conference code: 8

PY - 2017/10

Y1 - 2017/10

N2 - This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.

AB - This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.

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SP - 481

EP - 493

BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security

A2 - Rass, Stefan

A2 - An, Bo

A2 - Kiekintveld, Christopher

A2 - Fang, Fei

A2 - Schauer, Stefan

PB - Springer

T2 - 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017

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Laan CM, Barros AI, Boucherie R, Monsuur H. Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. In Rass S, An B, Kiekintveld C, Fang F, Schauer S, editors, Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. Springer. 2017. p. 481-493. ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

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