Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Corine Maartje Laan, Ana Isabel Barros, Richard Boucherie, Herman Monsuur

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Abstract

This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security
Subtitle of host publication8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings
EditorsStefan Rass, Bo An, Christopher Kiekintveld, Fei Fang, Stefan Schauer
PublisherSpringer
Pages481-493
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-68711-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-68710-0
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2017
Event8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 23 Oct 201725 Oct 2017
Conference number: 8

Publication series

Name Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume10575

Conference

Conference8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017
Abbreviated titleGameSec 2017
CountryAustria
CityVienna
Period23/10/1725/10/17

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Laan, C. M., Barros, A. I., Boucherie, R., & Monsuur, H. (2017). Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. In S. Rass, B. An, C. Kiekintveld, F. Fang, & S. Schauer (Eds.), Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 481-493). ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10575). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25
Laan, Corine Maartje ; Barros, Ana Isabel ; Boucherie, Richard ; Monsuur, Herman. / Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. editor / Stefan Rass ; Bo An ; Christopher Kiekintveld ; Fei Fang ; Stefan Schauer. Springer, 2017. pp. 481-493 ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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abstract = "This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.",
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Laan, CM, Barros, AI, Boucherie, R & Monsuur, H 2017, Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. in S Rass, B An, C Kiekintveld, F Fang & S Schauer (eds), Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10575, Springer, pp. 481-493, 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, 23/10/17. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. / Laan, Corine Maartje; Barros, Ana Isabel; Boucherie, Richard; Monsuur, Herman.

Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. ed. / Stefan Rass; Bo An; Christopher Kiekintveld; Fei Fang; Stefan Schauer. Springer, 2017. p. 481-493 ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10575).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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AB - This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability. We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.

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Laan CM, Barros AI, Boucherie R, Monsuur H. Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy. In Rass S, An B, Kiekintveld C, Fang F, Schauer S, editors, Decision and Game Theory for Security: 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Vienna, Austria, October 23-25, 2017, Proceedings. Springer. 2017. p. 481-493. ( Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_25