Security of Quantum-Readout PUFs against quadrature based challenge estimation attacks

Boris Škorić, Allard P. Mosk, Pepijn W.H. Pinkse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The concept of quantum-secure readout of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) has recently been realized experimentally in an optical PUF system. We analyze the security of this system under the strongest type of classical attack: the challenge estimation attack. The adversary performs a measurement on the challenge quantum state in order to learn as much about it as he can. Using this knowledge, he then tries to reconstruct the challenge and to emulate the PUF. We consider quadrature measurements, which are the most informative practical measurements known to us. We prove that even under this attack the expected number of photons detected in the verification mechanism is approximately a factor S + 1 too low; here S is the Quantum Security Parameter, defined as the number of modes in the optical system divided by the number of photons in the challenge. The photon count allows for a reliable distinction between an authentic PUF and a challenge estimation attack.
Original languageEnglish
Article number1350041
Number of pages15
JournalInternational journal of quantum information
Volume11
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Keywords

  • METIS-300727
  • IR-90091
  • Physical unclonable function
  • Quantum security
  • Quantum cryptography

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