Set games

Harry Aarts; Yukihiko Funaki; Kees Hoede

doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_14

Set games

Harry Aarts, Yukihiko Funaki, Kees Hoede

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic

Abstract

In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Power indices and coalition formation
Editors	Manfred J. Holler, Guillermo Owen
Place of Publication	Dordrecht, The Netherlands
Publisher	Kluwer Academic Publishers
Pages	230-251
ISBN (Print)	0-7923-7459-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_14
Publication status	Published - 2001

Keywords

METIS-201983
Cooperative game
Solution concept
Power index
Coalition formation
Grand coalition

Access to Document

10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_14

Cite this

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T1 - Set games

AU - Aarts, Harry

AU - Funaki, Yukihiko

AU - Hoede, Kees

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AB - In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.

KW - METIS-201983

KW - Cooperative game

KW - Solution concept

KW - Power index

KW - Coalition formation

KW - Grand coalition

U2 - 10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_14

DO - 10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1_14

M3 - Chapter

SN - 0-7923-7459-6

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EP - 251

BT - Power indices and coalition formation

A2 - Holler, Manfred J.

A2 - Owen, Guillermo

PB - Kluwer Academic Publishers

CY - Dordrecht, The Netherlands

ER -

Set games

Abstract

Keywords

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