Set games

Harry Aarts, Yukihiko Funaki, Kees Hoede

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic


    In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationPower indices and coalition formation
    EditorsManfred J. Holler, Guillermo Owen
    Place of PublicationDordrecht, The Netherlands
    PublisherKluwer Academic Publishers
    ISBN (Print)0-7923-7459-6
    Publication statusPublished - 2001


    • METIS-201983
    • Cooperative game
    • Solution concept
    • Power index
    • Coalition formation
    • Grand coalition

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