Abstract
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom of the Shapley value.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Power indices and coalition formation |
| Editors | Manfred J. Holler, Guillermo Owen |
| Place of Publication | Dordrecht, The Netherlands |
| Publisher | Kluwer Academic Publishers |
| Pages | 230-251 |
| ISBN (Print) | 0-7923-7459-6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
Keywords
- METIS-201983
- Cooperative game
- Solution concept
- Power index
- Coalition formation
- Grand coalition