Shapley value for constant-sum games

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

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4 Citations (Scopus)
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It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)223-227
Number of pages5
JournalInternational journal of game theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2003


  • MSC-91A12
  • Cooperative TU game
  • Value
  • Axiomatic characterization
  • Shapley value


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