Shapley value for constant-sum games

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

doi:10.1007/s001820300154

Shapley value for constant-sum games

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

6 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	223-227
Number of pages	5
Journal	International journal of game theory
Volume	32
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300154
Publication status	Published - 2003

Keywords

MSC-91A12
Cooperative TU game
Value
Axiomatic characterization
Shapley value

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10.1007/s001820300154

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title = "Shapley value for constant-sum games",

abstract = "It is proved that Young{\textquoteright}s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.",

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AU - Khmelnitskaya, Anna B.

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AB - It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symmetry is still valid for the Shapley value defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of grand coalition and on the entire class of constant-sum games as well.

KW - MSC-91A12

KW - Cooperative TU game

KW - Value

KW - Axiomatic characterization

KW - Shapley value

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0348198263

U2 - 10.1007/s001820300154

DO - 10.1007/s001820300154

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 32

SP - 223

EP - 227

JO - International journal of game theory

JF - International journal of game theory

IS - 2

ER -

Shapley value for constant-sum games

Abstract

Keywords

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