### Abstract

Mechanism design is concerned with the problem to compute desired outcomes in situations where data is distributed among selfish agents. We discuss some of the most fundamental questions in the design of mechanisms, and derive simple answers by interpreting the problem in graph theoretic terms. Specifically, much of mechanism design is thereby reformulated as shortest path problem.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Gems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms |

Editors | Andreas S. Schulz, Martin Skutella, Sebastian Stiller, Dorothea Wagner |

Place of Publication | Berlin |

Publisher | Springer |

Pages | 83-94 |

Number of pages | 13 |

ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-319-24971-1 |

ISBN (Print) | 978-3-319-24970-4 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 23 Dec 2015 |

### Keywords

- EWI-26781
- MSC-90C27
- MSC-90C35
- MSC-90C90
- IR-99346
- Revenue Equivalence
- Shortest Paths
- METIS-315584
- Mechanism Design

## Cite this

Müller, R., & Uetz, M. J. (2015). Shortest Path to Mechanism Design. In A. S. Schulz, M. Skutella, S. Stiller, & D. Wagner (Eds.),

*Gems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms*(pp. 83-94). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24971-1_8