Shortest Path to Mechanism Design

Rudolf Müller, Marc Jochen Uetz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
6 Downloads (Pure)


Mechanism design is concerned with the problem to compute desired outcomes in situations where data is distributed among selfish agents. We discuss some of the most fundamental questions in the design of mechanisms, and derive simple answers by interpreting the problem in graph theoretic terms. Specifically, much of mechanism design is thereby reformulated as shortest path problem.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms
EditorsAndreas S. Schulz, Martin Skutella, Sebastian Stiller, Dorothea Wagner
Place of PublicationBerlin
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-24971-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-24970-4
Publication statusPublished - 23 Dec 2015


  • EWI-26781
  • MSC-90C27
  • MSC-90C35
  • MSC-90C90
  • IR-99346
  • Revenue Equivalence
  • Shortest Paths
  • METIS-315584
  • Mechanism Design


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