Shortest Path to Mechanism Design

Rudolf Müller, Marc Jochen Uetz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Mechanism design is concerned with the problem to compute desired outcomes in situations where data is distributed among selfish agents. We discuss some of the most fundamental questions in the design of mechanisms, and derive simple answers by interpreting the problem in graph theoretic terms. Specifically, much of mechanism design is thereby reformulated as shortest path problem.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms
EditorsAndreas S. Schulz, Martin Skutella, Sebastian Stiller, Dorothea Wagner
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages83-94
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-24971-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-24970-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 Dec 2015

Keywords

  • EWI-26781
  • MSC-90C27
  • MSC-90C35
  • MSC-90C90
  • IR-99346
  • Revenue Equivalence
  • Shortest Paths
  • METIS-315584
  • Mechanism Design

Cite this

Müller, R., & Uetz, M. J. (2015). Shortest Path to Mechanism Design. In A. S. Schulz, M. Skutella, S. Stiller, & D. Wagner (Eds.), Gems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms (pp. 83-94). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24971-1_8