Side Channels in the McEliece PKC

Falko Strenzke; Erik  Tews; H. Gregor Molter; Raphael Overbeck; Abdulhadi Shoufan

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Side Channels in the McEliece PKC

Falko Strenzke, Erik Tews, H. Gregor Molter, Raphael Overbeck, Abdulhadi Shoufan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Post-Quantum Cryptography
Subtitle of host publication	Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, OH, USA, October 17-19, 2008, Proceedings
Editors	Johannes A. Buchmann, Jintai Ding
Place of Publication	Berlin
Publisher	Springer
Pages	216-229
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-540-88403-3
ISBN (Print)	978-3-540-88402-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15
Publication status	Published - 2008
Externally published	Yes
Event	2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008 - Cincinnati, United States Duration: 17 Oct 2008 → 19 Oct 2008 Conference number: 2

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	5299
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008
Abbreviated title	PQCrypto
Country/Territory	United States
City	Cincinnati
Period	17/10/08 → 19/10/08

Keywords

Side channel attack
Timing attack
Post quantum cryptography

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Cite this

Strenzke, F., Tews, E., Molter, H. G., Overbeck, R., & Shoufan, A. (2008). Side Channels in the McEliece PKC. In J. A. Buchmann, & J. Ding (Eds.), Post-Quantum Cryptography: Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, OH, USA, October 17-19, 2008, Proceedings (pp. 216-229). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5299). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

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title = "Side Channels in the McEliece PKC",

abstract = "The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.",

keywords = "Side channel attack, Timing attack, Post quantum cryptography",

author = "Falko Strenzke and Erik Tews and Molter, {H. Gregor} and Raphael Overbeck and Abdulhadi Shoufan",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15",

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series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

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editor = "Buchmann, {Johannes A.} and Jintai Ding",

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note = "2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008, PQCrypto ; Conference date: 17-10-2008 Through 19-10-2008",

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Strenzke, F, Tews, E, Molter, HG, Overbeck, R & Shoufan, A 2008, Side Channels in the McEliece PKC. in JA Buchmann & J Ding (eds), Post-Quantum Cryptography: Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, OH, USA, October 17-19, 2008, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5299, Springer, Berlin, pp. 216-229, 2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, Ohio, United States, 17/10/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Side Channels in the McEliece PKC. / Strenzke, Falko; Tews, Erik ; Molter, H. Gregor et al.
Post-Quantum Cryptography: Second International Workshop, PQCrypto 2008, Cincinnati, OH, USA, October 17-19, 2008, Proceedings. ed. / Johannes A. Buchmann; Jintai Ding. Berlin: Springer, 2008. p. 216-229 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 5299).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Side Channels in the McEliece PKC

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AU - Molter, H. Gregor

AU - Overbeck, Raphael

AU - Shoufan, Abdulhadi

N1 - Conference code: 2

PY - 2008

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N2 - The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

AB - The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

KW - Side channel attack

KW - Timing attack

KW - Post quantum cryptography

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

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BT - Post-Quantum Cryptography

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T2 - 2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2008

Y2 - 17 October 2008 through 19 October 2008

ER -

Side Channels in the McEliece PKC

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Keywords

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