Sloppy Alice Attacks! Adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks on the McEliece public-key cryptosystem

Erik R. Verheul, Jeroen M. Doumen, Henk C.A. van Tilborg

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    Abstract

    We introduce new adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, called Sloppy Alic Attacks, in which a malicious sender or an adaptive eavesdropper Eve has an oracle which allows her to find out whether a sent encrypted message does, or does not, decrypt properly. From this information she can extract the plaintext that was encrypted. In this paper we show that the McEliece public-key cryptosystem is susceptible to Sloppy Alice attacks.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationInformation, Coding and Mathematics
    Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of Workshop honoring Prof. Bob McEliece on his 60th birthday
    EditorsMario Blaum, Patrick G. Farrell, Henk C.A. van Tilborg
    Place of PublicationNew York, NY
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages99-119
    ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4757-3585-7
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4020-7079-2, 978-1-4419-5289-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2002
    EventInformation, coding and mathematics: Workshop honoring prof. Bob McEliece on his 60th birthday - Caltech, Pasadena, United States
    Duration: 24 May 200225 May 2002

    Publication series

    NameThe Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science
    PublisherSpringer
    Volume687
    ISSN (Print)0893-3405

    Workshop

    WorkshopInformation, coding and mathematics
    Country/TerritoryUnited States
    CityPasadena
    Period24/05/0225/05/02

    Keywords

    • SCS-Cybersecurity
    • n/a OA procedure

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