Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya*, John A. Weymark

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


In this article, the kinds of utility comparisons that can be made may differ in distinct population subgroups. Within each subgroup, utility is either ordinally or cardinally measurable. Levels and differences of utility may or may not be interpersonally comparable within a subgroup. No utility comparisons are possible between subgroups. Given these informational assumptions, it is shown that any continuous social welfare ordering that satisfies the weak Pareto principle only depends on the utilities of one of the subgroups. The class of social welfare orderings consistent with these assumptions is determined by the scale type of the dictatorial subgroup.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)739-748
Number of pages10
JournalSocial choice and welfare
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2000
Externally publishedYes


  • Social welfare
  • Social choice
  • Distinct population
  • Scale type
  • Population subgroup


Dive into the research topics of 'Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this