Social context in potential games

Martin Hoefer*, Alexander Skopalik

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)
14 Downloads (Pure)


A prevalent assumption in game theory is that all players act in a purely selfish manner, but this assumption has been repeatedly questioned by economists and social scientists. In this paper, we study a model that allows to incorporate the social context of players into their decision making. We consider the impact of other-regarding preferences in potential games, one of the most popular and central classes of games in algorithmic game theory. Our results concern the existence of pure Nash equilibria and potential functions in games with social context. The main finding is a tight characterization of the class of potential games that admit exact potential functions for any social context. In addition, we prove complexity results on deciding existence of pure Nash equilibria in numerous popular classes of potential games, such as different classes of load balancing, congestion, cost and market sharing games.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics
Subtitle of host publication8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Proceedings
EditorsPaul W. Goldberg
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-642-35311-6
Publication statusPublished - 26 Dec 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012 - Liverpool, United Kingdom
Duration: 10 Dec 201212 Dec 2012
Conference number: 8

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7695 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012
Abbreviated titleWINE 2012
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom


Dive into the research topics of 'Social context in potential games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this