Abstract
A prevalent assumption in game theory is that all players act in a purely selfish manner, but this assumption has been repeatedly questioned by economists and social scientists. In this paper, we study a model that allows to incorporate the social context of players into their decision making. We consider the impact of other-regarding preferences in potential games, one of the most popular and central classes of games in algorithmic game theory. Our results concern the existence of pure Nash equilibria and potential functions in games with social context. The main finding is a tight characterization of the class of potential games that admit exact potential functions for any social context. In addition, we prove complexity results on deciding existence of pure Nash equilibria in numerous popular classes of potential games, such as different classes of load balancing, congestion, cost and market sharing games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Internet and Network Economics |
| Subtitle of host publication | 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Proceedings |
| Editors | Paul W. Goldberg |
| Pages | 364-377 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-642-35311-6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 26 Dec 2012 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012 - Liverpool, United Kingdom Duration: 10 Dec 2012 → 12 Dec 2012 Conference number: 8 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 7695 LNCS |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
| Conference | 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | WINE 2012 |
| Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
| City | Liverpool |
| Period | 10/12/12 → 12/12/12 |