Social dilemmas, time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’ resource game may induce several ‘subjective’ games in the class of social dilemmas. Which unique ‘subjective’ game is actually played depends crucially on how the agents discount their future payoffs. We examine equilibrium behavior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool resource system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting. A sufficient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the degree of patience between agents is sufficiently dissimilar, the more patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium. We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-258
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of bioeconomics
Volume16
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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technology adoption
social dilemma
resource
resources
bodies of water
sustainability
time
Technology adoption
Time preference
Social dilemma
fish
interaction
Resources
water

Keywords

  • METIS-304925
  • IR-91759

Cite this

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Social dilemmas, time preferences and technology adoption in a commons problem. / Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.

In: Journal of bioeconomics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2014, p. 239-258.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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