Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability

Carsten K.W. De Dreu*, Ellen Giebels, Evert Van De Vliert

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

127 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Two studies tested the effects of negotiators' social motive (cooperative vs. individualistic) and punitive capability (high vs. low) on trust, negotiation behavior, and joint outcomes. On the basis of structural goal-expectation theory (T. Yamagishi, 1986), it was predicted that in the case of a cooperative motive higher levels of punitive capability lead to less trust, less exchange of information about preferences and priorities, and agreements of lower joint outcome. Study 1 (N = 41) supported this prediction: Cooperative negotiators had lower trust, exchanged less information, and attained lower joint outcomes under high rather than low punitive capability; individualistic negotiators were not influenced by punitive capability, presumably because they have low levels of trust to start with. Study 2 (N = 21) showed that these effects happened because higher levels of punitive capability increase conflict avoidance in negotiators with a cooperative motive.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)408-422
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of applied psychology
Volume83
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 1998
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this