Solutions to sequencing and bargaining games

Guangjing Yang

Research output: ThesisPhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

97 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Game theory plays an important role in promoting rational individuals to cooperate with each other, improving strategies and optimizing resource allocations. In scheduling problems, we can establish cooperative or noncooperative game models to encourage participants to spontaneously form stable and optimal scheduling, and provide reasonable allocation schemes. However, the foundation of classical sequencing games is rooted in cooperative game theory, and does not involve noncooperative game theory. On the other hand, for noncooperative bargaining games, two kinds of bargaining models are defined. We reveal the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria of these games and analyze the properties of the expected equilibrium payoffs of players.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • University of Twente
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Uetz, Marc Jochen, Supervisor
  • Sun, Hao, Supervisor, External person
  • Hoeksma, Ruben Pieter, Co-Supervisor
Award date24 Feb 2021
Place of PublicationEnschede
Publisher
Print ISBNs978-90-365-5129-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 24 Feb 2021

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • Noncooperative games
  • Sequencing games
  • Optimal order
  • Allocations
  • core
  • Characterization
  • Bargaining
  • Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium

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