Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits?

Research output: Book/ReportReportOther research output

118 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We consider a stock point for expensive, low-usage items that is operated by multiple decision makers. Each faces a Poisson demand process, and the joint stock point is controlled by a continuous-review base stock policy with full backordering. We consider penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for stock on hand. For this model, we derive structural properties of the resulting cost function. We use these to prove not only that it is cost e�ective to share one stock point with all parties involved, but also that collaboration (inventory pooling) can be supported by a stable cost allocation, i.e., the core of the associated cooperative game is non-empty. These results hold under optimized and under exogenously given base stock levels. For the former case, we further identify a stable cost allocation that would be easy to implement in practice and that induces players to reveal their private information truthfully.
Original languageUndefined
PublisherBETA Research Institute
Number of pages51
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameBETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213
PublisherBETA Research Institute
No.372

Keywords

  • IR-79848

Cite this

Karsten, F., & Basten, R. J. I. (2012). Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits? (BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213; No. 372). BETA Research Institute.
Karsten, Frank ; Basten, Robertus Johannes Ida. / Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits?. BETA Research Institute, 2012. 51 p. (BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213; 372).
@book{f7e4f5861aa443b189c32d9a163dd90f,
title = "Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits?",
abstract = "We consider a stock point for expensive, low-usage items that is operated by multiple decision makers. Each faces a Poisson demand process, and the joint stock point is controlled by a continuous-review base stock policy with full backordering. We consider penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for stock on hand. For this model, we derive structural properties of the resulting cost function. We use these to prove not only that it is cost e�ective to share one stock point with all parties involved, but also that collaboration (inventory pooling) can be supported by a stable cost allocation, i.e., the core of the associated cooperative game is non-empty. These results hold under optimized and under exogenously given base stock levels. For the former case, we further identify a stable cost allocation that would be easy to implement in practice and that induces players to reveal their private information truthfully.",
keywords = "IR-79848",
author = "Frank Karsten and Basten, {Robertus Johannes Ida}",
note = "NUR 804",
year = "2012",
language = "Undefined",
series = "BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213",
publisher = "BETA Research Institute",
number = "372",

}

Karsten, F & Basten, RJI 2012, Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits? BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213, no. 372, BETA Research Institute.

Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits? / Karsten, Frank; Basten, Robertus Johannes Ida.

BETA Research Institute, 2012. 51 p. (BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213; No. 372).

Research output: Book/ReportReportOther research output

TY - BOOK

T1 - Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits?

AU - Karsten, Frank

AU - Basten, Robertus Johannes Ida

N1 - NUR 804

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - We consider a stock point for expensive, low-usage items that is operated by multiple decision makers. Each faces a Poisson demand process, and the joint stock point is controlled by a continuous-review base stock policy with full backordering. We consider penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for stock on hand. For this model, we derive structural properties of the resulting cost function. We use these to prove not only that it is cost e�ective to share one stock point with all parties involved, but also that collaboration (inventory pooling) can be supported by a stable cost allocation, i.e., the core of the associated cooperative game is non-empty. These results hold under optimized and under exogenously given base stock levels. For the former case, we further identify a stable cost allocation that would be easy to implement in practice and that induces players to reveal their private information truthfully.

AB - We consider a stock point for expensive, low-usage items that is operated by multiple decision makers. Each faces a Poisson demand process, and the joint stock point is controlled by a continuous-review base stock policy with full backordering. We consider penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for stock on hand. For this model, we derive structural properties of the resulting cost function. We use these to prove not only that it is cost e�ective to share one stock point with all parties involved, but also that collaboration (inventory pooling) can be supported by a stable cost allocation, i.e., the core of the associated cooperative game is non-empty. These results hold under optimized and under exogenously given base stock levels. For the former case, we further identify a stable cost allocation that would be easy to implement in practice and that induces players to reveal their private information truthfully.

KW - IR-79848

M3 - Report

T3 - BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213

BT - Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits?

PB - BETA Research Institute

ER -

Karsten F, Basten RJI. Spare parts inventory pooling: how to share the benefits? BETA Research Institute, 2012. 51 p. (BETA publicatie, working paper, ISSN 1386-9213; 372).