Abstract
This paper presents a new approach for verifying confidentiality
for programs, based on abstract interpretation. The
framework is formally developed and proved correct in the
theorem prover PVS. We use dynamic labeling functions
to abstractly interpret a simple programming language via
modification of security levels of variables. Our approach
is sound and compositional and results in an algorithm for
statically checking confidentiality.
Original language | Undefined |
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Pages | 50-56 |
Number of pages | 7 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Event | WITS '05: 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security - Long Beach, CA Duration: 10 Jan 2005 → 11 Jan 2005 |
Workshop
Workshop | WITS '05: 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security |
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Period | 10/01/05 → 11/01/05 |
Other | 10-11 Jan 2005 |
Keywords
- SCS-Cybersecurity
- IR-65097
- EWI-14062