Strategic Responsibility Under Imperfect Information

Vahid Yazdanpanah, Mehdi Dastani, Wojciech Jamroga, Natasha Alechina, Brian Logan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)
1 Downloads (Pure)


A central issue in the specification and verification of autonomous agents and multiagent systems is the ascription of responsibility to individual agents and groups of agents. When designing a (multi)agent system, we must specify which agents or groups of agents are responsible for bringing about a particular state of affairs. Similarly, when verifying a multiagent system, we may wish to determine the responsibility of agents or groups of agents for a particular state of affairs, and the contribution of each agent to bringing about that state of affairs. In this paper, we discuss several aspects of responsibility, including strategic ability of agents, their epistemic properties, and their relationship to the evolution of the system behavior. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning about the responsibility of individual agents and agent groups in terms of the agents' strategies and epistemic properties, and state some properties of the framework.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS '19 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
PublisherThe International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4503-6309-9
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 13 May 201917 May 2019
Conference number: 18


Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
Abbreviated titleAAMAS
Internet address


  • Responsibility in agent systems
  • Strategic reasoning
  • Concurrent game structures
  • Temporal and modal logic


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