Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions

Stephan Kleber, Rens W. van der Heijden, Henning Kopp, Frank Kargl

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Distance bounding protocols (DBPs) are security protocols that aim to limit the maximum possible distance between two partners in a wireless communication. This enables to ensure locality of interaction between two devices. Despite numerous proposed protocols, recent analyses of DBPs have shown the majority of them to be susceptible to attacks. Most prominent among the unsolved security problems of DBPs is terrorist fraud. This type of attack involves collaboration with a legitimate device, after which the attacker can successfully execute the protocol. We show how terrorist fraud can be prevented by replacing shared secrets – commonly used in classical DBPs – with physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our new approach can be integrated in all current DBPs with minor modifications. We offer two alternate designs: One utilizing challenge-response PUFs and another using so-called SIMPL systems, a PUF-analogue to public-key cryptography. We use a security model proposed by previous work to demonstrate security of our scheme.
    Original languageUndefined
    Title of host publication2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys)
    Place of PublicationUSA
    PublisherIEEE Computer Society
    Pages1-8
    Number of pages8
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4799-5804-7
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2015
    Event2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015 - Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus-Senftenberg, Cottbus, Germany
    Duration: 9 Mar 201512 Mar 2015

    Publication series

    Name
    PublisherIEEE Computer Society

    Conference

    Conference2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015
    Abbreviated titleNetSys
    CountryGermany
    CityCottbus
    Period9/03/1512/03/15

    Keywords

    • SCS-Cybersecurity
    • METIS-315117
    • distance bounding protocols
    • radio networks
    • security model
    • security problems
    • EWI-26621
    • Public key cryptography
    • PUF-analogue
    • Time factors
    • terrorism
    • terrorist fraud resistance
    • telecommunication security
    • timing
    • Computational modeling
    • SIMPL systems
    • Wireless communication
    • Protocols
    • IR-98834
    • physical unclonable functions

    Cite this

    Kleber, S., van der Heijden, R. W., Kopp, H., & Kargl, F. (2015). Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions. In 2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys) (pp. 1-8). USA: IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068