Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions

Stephan Kleber; Rens W. van der Heijden; Henning Kopp; Frank Kargl

doi:10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068

Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions

Stephan Kleber, Rens W. van der Heijden, Henning Kopp, Frank Kargl

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

4 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Distance bounding protocols (DBPs) are security protocols that aim to limit the maximum possible distance between two partners in a wireless communication. This enables to ensure locality of interaction between two devices. Despite numerous proposed protocols, recent analyses of DBPs have shown the majority of them to be susceptible to attacks. Most prominent among the unsolved security problems of DBPs is terrorist fraud. This type of attack involves collaboration with a legitimate device, after which the attacker can successfully execute the protocol. We show how terrorist fraud can be prevented by replacing shared secrets – commonly used in classical DBPs – with physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our new approach can be integrated in all current DBPs with minor modifications. We offer two alternate designs: One utilizing challenge-response PUFs and another using so-called SIMPL systems, a PUF-analogue to public-key cryptography. We use a security model proposed by previous work to demonstrate security of our scheme.

Original language	Undefined
Title of host publication	2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys)
Place of Publication	USA
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	1-8
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4799-5804-7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068
Publication status	Published - Mar 2015
Event	2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015 - Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus-Senftenberg, Cottbus, Germany Duration: 9 Mar 2015 → 12 Mar 2015

Publication series

Name
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society

Conference

Conference	2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015
Abbreviated title	NetSys
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Cottbus
Period	9/03/15 → 12/03/15

Keywords

SCS-Cybersecurity
METIS-315117
distance bounding protocols
radio networks
security model
security problems
EWI-26621
Public key cryptography
PUF-analogue
Time factors
terrorism
terrorist fraud resistance
telecommunication security
timing
Computational modeling
SIMPL systems
Wireless communication
Protocols
IR-98834
physical unclonable functions

Access to Document

10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068

http://eprints.eemcs.utwente.nl/secure2/26621/01/2015-03-netsys.pdf

Cite this

@inproceedings{5dab3bfd48db4343bfaede168aeb75a5,

title = "Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions",

abstract = "Distance bounding protocols (DBPs) are security protocols that aim to limit the maximum possible distance between two partners in a wireless communication. This enables to ensure locality of interaction between two devices. Despite numerous proposed protocols, recent analyses of DBPs have shown the majority of them to be susceptible to attacks. Most prominent among the unsolved security problems of DBPs is terrorist fraud. This type of attack involves collaboration with a legitimate device, after which the attacker can successfully execute the protocol. We show how terrorist fraud can be prevented by replacing shared secrets – commonly used in classical DBPs – with physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our new approach can be integrated in all current DBPs with minor modifications. We offer two alternate designs: One utilizing challenge-response PUFs and another using so-called SIMPL systems, a PUF-analogue to public-key cryptography. We use a security model proposed by previous work to demonstrate security of our scheme.",

keywords = "SCS-Cybersecurity, METIS-315117, distance bounding protocols, radio networks, security model, security problems, EWI-26621, Public key cryptography, PUF-analogue, Time factors, terrorism, terrorist fraud resistance, telecommunication security, timing, Computational modeling, SIMPL systems, Wireless communication, Protocols, IR-98834, physical unclonable functions",

author = "Stephan Kleber and {van der Heijden}, {Rens W.} and Henning Kopp and Frank Kargl",

note = "10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068 ; 2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015 ; Conference date: 09-03-2015 Through 12-03-2015",

year = "2015",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068",

language = "Undefined",

isbn = "978-1-4799-5804-7",

publisher = "IEEE",

pages = "1--8",

booktitle = "2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys)",

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Kleber, S, van der Heijden, RW, Kopp, H & Kargl, F 2015, Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions. in 2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys). IEEE, USA, pp. 1-8, 2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems, NetSys 2015, Cottbus, Germany, 9/03/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/NetSys.2015.7089068

Terrorist fraud resistance of distance bounding protocols employing physical unclonable functions. / Kleber, Stephan; van der Heijden, Rens W.; Kopp, Henning et al.
2015 International Conference and Workshops on Networked Systems (NetSys). USA: IEEE, 2015. p. 1-8.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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N2 - Distance bounding protocols (DBPs) are security protocols that aim to limit the maximum possible distance between two partners in a wireless communication. This enables to ensure locality of interaction between two devices. Despite numerous proposed protocols, recent analyses of DBPs have shown the majority of them to be susceptible to attacks. Most prominent among the unsolved security problems of DBPs is terrorist fraud. This type of attack involves collaboration with a legitimate device, after which the attacker can successfully execute the protocol. We show how terrorist fraud can be prevented by replacing shared secrets – commonly used in classical DBPs – with physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Our new approach can be integrated in all current DBPs with minor modifications. We offer two alternate designs: One utilizing challenge-response PUFs and another using so-called SIMPL systems, a PUF-analogue to public-key cryptography. We use a security model proposed by previous work to demonstrate security of our scheme.

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