The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty

Walter Kern; X. Qui

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5

The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty

Walter Kern, X. Qui

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

17 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A cooperative bin packing game is an N -person game, where the player set N consists of k bins of capacity 1 each and n items of sizes $a_1,\dots,a_n$. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be packed into the bins of the coalition. We adopt the taxation model proposed by Faigle and Kern (1993) [6] and show that the 1/4-core is nonempty for all instances of the bin packing game. This strengthens the main result in [3].

Original language	Undefined
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013
Editors	Dingzhu Du, Guochuan Zhang
Place of Publication	Berlin
Publisher	Springer
Pages	41-52
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-38767-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5_6
Publication status	Published - 2013
Event	19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013 - Hangzhou, China Duration: 21 Jun 2013 → 23 Jun 2013

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Volume	7936
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013
Period	21/06/13 → 23/06/13
Other	21-23 June 2013

Keywords

EWI-24510
IR-89559
METIS-302721

Access to Document

http://eprints.eemcs.utwente.nl/secure2/24510/01/chp%253A10.1007%252F978-3-642-38768-5_6.pdf

Cite this

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title = "The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty",

abstract = "A cooperative bin packing game is an N -person game, where the player set N consists of k bins of capacity 1 each and n items of sizes $a_1,\dots,a_n$. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be packed into the bins of the coalition. We adopt the taxation model proposed by Faigle and Kern (1993) [6] and show that the 1/4-core is nonempty for all instances of the bin packing game. This strengthens the main result in [3].",

keywords = "EWI-24510, IR-89559, METIS-302721",

author = "Walter Kern and X. Qui",

note = "10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5 ; 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013 ; Conference date: 21-06-2013 Through 23-06-2013",

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language = "Undefined",

isbn = "978-3-642-38767-8",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer",

pages = "41--52",

editor = "Dingzhu Du and Guochuan Zhang",

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Kern, W & Qui, X 2013, The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty. in D Du & G Zhang (eds), Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7936, Springer, Berlin, pp. 41-52, 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013, 21/06/13. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38768-5_6

The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty. / Kern, Walter; Qui, X.
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013. ed. / Dingzhu Du; Guochuan Zhang. Berlin: Springer, 2013. p. 41-52 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 7936).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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