The 1/4-core of the uniform bin packing game is nonempty

Walter Kern, X. Qui

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A cooperative bin packing game is an N -person game, where the player set N consists of k bins of capacity 1 each and n items of sizes $a_1,\dots,a_n$. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum total size of items in the coalition that can be packed into the bins of the coalition. We adopt the taxation model proposed by Faigle and Kern (1993) [6] and show that the 1/4-core is nonempty for all instances of the bin packing game. This strengthens the main result in [3].
Original languageUndefined
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013
EditorsDingzhu Du, Guochuan Zhang
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages41-52
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-38767-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013 - Hangzhou, China
Duration: 21 Jun 201323 Jun 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Volume7936
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2013
Period21/06/1323/06/13
Other21-23 June 2013

Keywords

  • EWI-24510
  • IR-89559
  • METIS-302721

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