The approximate f-core and the utopia payoff for infinite assignment games

N. Llorca, J. Sanchez-Soriano, S. Tijs, Judith B. Timmer

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Assignment problems where both sets of agents are countably infinite, the so-called infinite assignment problems, are studied as well as the related assignment games. Further, two solutions for these games are studied. The first one is the approximate f-core for games with a finite value. This particular solution takes into account that due to organisational limitations only finite groups of agents can protest against proposals of profit distributions. Second, we study the utopia payoff, the perfect proposal in which each agent receives the maximal amount he can get.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Faculty of Mathematical Sciences
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)01690-2690
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Publication series

NameMemorandum faculteit TW
PublisherDepartment of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente
ISSN (Print)0169-2690


  • IR-65784
  • MSC-91A12
  • EWI-3417
  • METIS-201746

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