The comitology game: European policymaking with parliamentary involvement

Bernard Steunenberg, Dieter Schmidtchen

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Abstract

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationSaarbrücken, Germany
PublisherCenter for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarland University
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 2000
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameCSLE Discussion Paper
PublisherSaarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics
No.2000-05

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    Steunenberg, B., & Schmidtchen, D. (2000). The comitology game: European policymaking with parliamentary involvement. (CSLE Discussion Paper; No. 2000-05). Saarbrücken, Germany: Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarland University.