TY - BOOK
T1 - The comitology game
T2 - European policymaking with parliamentary involvement
AU - Steunenberg, Bernard
AU - Schmidtchen, Dieter
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game.
AB - This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game.
M3 - Report
T3 - CSLE Discussion Paper
BT - The comitology game
PB - Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE), Saarland University
CY - Saarbrücken, Germany
ER -