The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal

Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
72 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the (symmetrical) core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero-monotonicity, or monotonicity.
Original languageEnglish
Article number379848
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of applied mathematics
Volume2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Aug 2012

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this