The Council Presidency : Power broker or burden? An empirical analysis

Andreas Warntjen

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62 Citations (Scopus)


The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)315-338
Number of pages24
JournalEuropean Union politics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2008


  • IR-60036
  • METIS-250143
  • EU legislation
  • Power
  • Council Presidency
  • Council of the European Union

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