The Egalitarian Nonpairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) Value for TU-Games

Theo S.H. Driessen, Yukihiko Funaki

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    The paper introduces a new solution concept for transferable utility games called the Egalitarian Non-Pairwise-Averaged Contribution (ENPAC-) value. This solution arises from the egalitarian division of the surplus of the overall profits after each participant is conceded to get his pairwise-averaged contribution. Four interpretations of the ENPAC-value are presented. The second part of the paper provides sufficient conditions on the transferable utility game to guarantee that the ENPAC-value coincides with the well-known solution called prenucleolus. The main conditions require that the largest excesses at the ENPAC-value are attained at the (n — 2)-person coalitions, whereas the excesses of (n — 2)-person coalitions at the ENPAC-value do not differ.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationGame Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research
    EditorsT. Parthasarathy, B. Dutta, J.A.M. Potters, T.E.S. Raghavan, D. Ray, A. Sen
    Place of PublicationKluwer, Dordrecht
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages51-66
    Number of pages16
    ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4757-2640-4
    ISBN (Print)978-1-4419-4780-2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 15 Jan 1997

    Keywords

    • Cooperative game
    • Large excess
    • Solution concept
    • Grand coalition
    • Payoff vector

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