The Moral Standing of Machines: Towards a Relational and Non-Cartesian Moral Hermeneutics

Mark Coeckelbergh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Should we give moral standing to machines? In this paper, I explore the implications of a relational approach to moral standing for thinking about machines, in particular autonomous, intelligent robots. I show how my version of this approach, which focuses on moral relations and on the conditions of possibility of moral status ascription, provides a way to take critical distance from what I call the “standard” approach to thinking about moral status and moral standing, which is based on properties. It does not only overcome epistemological problems with the standard approach, but can also explain how we think about, experience, and act towards machines—including the gap that sometimes occurs between reasoning and experience. I also articulate the non-Cartesian orientation of my “relational” research program and specify the way it contributes to a different paradigm in thinking about moral standing and moral knowledge.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-77
JournalPhilosophy and technology
Volume27
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2014

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Moral Standing
Hermeneutics
Moral Status
Epistemological
Research Program
Robot
Conditions of Possibility
Paradigm
Moral Knowledge

Keywords

  • IR-87918
  • METIS-299001

Cite this

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The Moral Standing of Machines: Towards a Relational and Non-Cartesian Moral Hermeneutics. / Coeckelbergh, Mark.

In: Philosophy and technology, Vol. 27, No. 1, 01.10.2014, p. 61-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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