The Myerson value for cooperative games on communication structure with fuzzy coalition

Genjiu Xu (Corresponding Author), Xianghui Li, Hao Sun, Jun Su

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


In the field of cooperative games there is an extensive literature that studies various situations of cooperation.
Myerson (1977) introduced the communication structure which is an undirected graph describing the bilateral relationships
among the players and the Myerson value of a game is obtained by taking the Shapley value of an auxiliary graph game on
communication structure. Aubin (1981) proposed fuzzy cooperative games in which players have the possibility to cooperate
with different participation levels. In this paper we consider cooperative games on communication structure with fuzzy
coalition. The Myerson value and its individual rational revision are defined as the Shapley value of newly auxiliary graph
games and discussed based on Choquet integral form and proportional form respectively. They are also characterized in
terms of some extended component efficiency and fairness. Furthermore, by showing that the Myerson value is a fuzzy core
allocation, the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core is verified for a graph game on communication structure with fuzzy coalition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-39
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 22 Jun 2017
Externally publishedYes


  • Fuzzy cooperative game
  • communication structure
  • Myerson value
  • individual rational
  • fuzzy core

Cite this